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**From:** Crnich, Carolyn [CCrnich@co.humboldt.ca.us]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, July 31, 2007 10:44 AM  
**To:** Voting Systems  
**Subject:** Written Comment On Top-To-Bottom Review of Electronic Election Systems  
**Importance:** High

Honorable Secretary Bowen,

Having studied the reports of the on the Top-to-Bottom Review as well as the report of the Working Group on Post-Election Audit, I recommend a blended but conservative approach to the security of future elections in California.

I believe the basis of a secure, accurate and auditable election is the paper ballot. While the cost of printing, transporting and storing paper ballots increases the cost of an election, that expense is out-weighed by the auditability and security of the paper ballot. To eliminate the use of "touch-screen" (including Hart's e-Slate) machines would be a disservice to California's voters who live with disabilities. But to extend the use of that equipment to all voters increases the risk of tampering. As attractive as these machines might be to some able-bodied voters, we all don't get to park between the blue lines.

It is my hope that by increasing and improving the post-election audit, the integrity of California elections will 'raise the bar' for elections throughout the United States.

My two recommendations for your consideration are:

- 1.) Limit the use of DRE systems to those voters who require or request the use of accessible voting equipment. By limiting the use of DRE systems, a risk assessment would likely show that the possibility of hacking or tampering would be lowered. At the same time, voters with disabilities would be served and the requirements of HAVA would be met. The voting systems used by all other voters should be paper-based and optically scanned either at the polling place or at central count. While optical scan systems have been shown to be vulnerable to attack, I feel that the risk of such attack is lowered by the security measures currently in place. (There is a inspector "standing guard" next to each of our optical scan machines. It appears to the voter that this pollworker is there to make sure their ballot slides from the secrecy sleeve into the optical scan device and then hand them the "I Voted" sticker, but they are actually serving as an additional layer of security)
- 2.) Increase the required audit of paper ballots to include a higher percentage of randomly selected precincts and Tiered Audits (section 3.1 and 3.2 of Post-Election Audit Standards Working Group Report). While I will concede that such increased audit levels may be easier for smaller counties to achieve, a uniform audit practice must be developed and applied to all California counties without regard to size. There is nothing more critical to the integrity of the election process or the election results than stringent audit practices.

I appreciate your consideration of these suggestions.

Sincerely,

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07/31/2007